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INTRODUCTION 
For over thirty years, victims and survivors of gross human rights abuses 
have sought justice in federal courts, filing lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS)1 against former heads of state, other government officials, military 
commanders, members of death squads, and both U.S. and foreign corporations.2 
In 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the narrow but potent reach of the ATS in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, holding that the statute permits human rights claims for 
violations of a small set of clearly defined, widely accepted international human 
rights norms.3 
 
* Paul L. Hoffman, a partner at Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris and Hoffman LLP, is counsel 
for the petitioners in Kiobel and has represented plaintiffs in many of the cases discussed in this 
Article. Beth Stephens, Professor of Law at Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, has assisted 
the Kiobel petitioners and has also represented plaintiffs in several of the cases described below. The 
authors appreciate the research assistance of Mohammad A. Mahmood, a Rutgers-Camden student. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2. See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
COURTS (2d ed. 2008), for a detailed discussion of ATS litigation. 
3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
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In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court is currently 
considering a challenge that could significantly narrow the reach of the ATS.4 In 
February 2012, the Court heard oral arguments on whether the statute permits 
suits against corporate defendants. Shortly after the argument, the Court asked for 
rebriefing and reargument on the broader question of whether the statute “allows 
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring 
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”5 The Court heard 
argument on that issue on October 1, 2012, and a decision is likely in early 2013. 
The Kiobel decision could have only a minor impact on future ATS claims or, if the 
Court finds that the ATS does not apply to claims arising out of conduct 
committed on foreign soil, it could greatly restrict the scope of the statute. The 
Court is also likely to decide the extent to which corporations and other judicial 
entities may be sued under the ATS. 
But even under the most restrictive outcome of the Kiobel decision, human 
rights cases will continue in both federal and state courts. First, as explained in 
Part I of this Article, no matter how the Court decides Kiobel, significant 
international human rights litigation will continue in federal courts under the 
remaining core of the ATS and through supplemental or diversity jurisdiction and 
other federal statutes. 
Second, if the Kiobel decision bars claims currently litigated in federal courts 
under the ATS, some of those claims will be litigated instead in state courts. This 
is an unsurprising result: courts, commentators, and litigators have long 
recognized that the ATS affords federal jurisdiction over common law claims that 
also fall within the jurisdiction of the state courts.6 In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the first 
modern ATS case, the Second Circuit noted that the state courts would have had 
jurisdiction over the same claim.7 Moreover, the U.S. government has accepted 
international law commitments with the understanding that the states will 
implement some of those obligations. When providing its consent to the 
 
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
472 (2011) (mem.) (case argued Feb. 2012 and restored to docket for reargument, 132 S. Ct. 1738 
(No. 10-1491) (Mar. 5, 2012) (mem.)). 
5. Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (No. 10-1491) (Mar. 5, 2012) (mem.) (order restoring case to docket 
for reargument). 
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human 
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filártiga v. Peña Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 63–64 
(1981) (discussing the eighteenth century view of international law violations as transitory torts over 
which the states have jurisdiction); see also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over 
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 489–95 (1986) (reviewing the 
history of the ATS and explaining that its primary goal was to ensure federal control over issues that 
would otherwise be left to the states). 
7. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Here, where in personam 
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant, the parties agree that the acts alleged would violate 
Paraguayan law, and the policies of the forum are consistent with the foreign law, state court 
jurisdiction would be proper. Indeed, appellees conceded as much at oral argument.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 for example, the Senate 
understanding stating that “the United States understands that this Covenant shall 
be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises 
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by 
the state and local governments . . . .”9 
State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear claims based on injuries 
inflicted outside of the United States, because U.S. courts—both state and 
federal—can generally hear “transitory torts,” claims arising outside their territory, 
if the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.10 Federal courts are 
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and must rely on a specific grant of 
jurisdiction—the ATS, for example, or diversity jurisdiction—to justify hearing a 
claim.11 But state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with no comparable 
subject matter jurisdiction restrictions. Thus, as long as a state court has personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, that court will generally have jurisdiction to hear 
claims arising out of human rights violations in a foreign state—claims such as 
wrongful death, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. 
In practice, human rights claims were litigated in state courts for decades 
before Filártiga inaugurated modern ATS claims; these cases are discussed in 
Part II. Moreover, as explained in Part III, post-Filártiga human rights claims 
based on state law have been litigated in both federal and state courts on behalf of 
U.S. citizens and when ATS claims were unavailable for other reasons. Part IV 
offers an overview of future human rights litigation in state courts or based on 
state law, discussing some of the differences between such claims and federal ATS 
claims, differences that will offer litigants both legal and practical advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The rise of human rights litigation under the ATS corresponds with dynamic 
and rapid developments in international human rights litigation and institutions at 
the international level in the last several decades. These developments have played 
an essential role in the formulation of a body of human rights jurisprudence under 
the ATS. There has been a concomitant rise in the creation and activities of 
thousands of human rights organizations throughout the world that monitor and 
challenge human rights violators, including corporate and other private actors. 
 
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. 
E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
9. 138 CONG. REC. S4781–84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (emphasis added). 
10. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (quoting JUSTICE STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 554, 543 (1846) (“[B]y the common law[,] personal 
actions, being transitory, may be brought in any place, where the party defendant may be found . . .”)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The transitory tort doctrine has been recognized in U.S. courts for 
more than 200 years. See, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 664 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) 
(No. 8411) (Marshall, Circuit J.) (stating that “an action for a personal wrong . . . is admitted to be 
transitory”). 
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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The Supreme Court cannot end these developments any more than it can repeal 
the laws of gravity. If the Court limits the availability of ATS actions in federal 
courts, it will usher in a new era of human rights litigation in state courts across 
the United States. 
I. POST-KIOBEL FEDERAL COURT HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
The Kiobel decision will not signal the end of federal court human rights 
litigation. First, some ATS claims will survive. Even the most extreme Supreme 
Court decision—rejecting all corporate defendant litigation and all cases arising in 
foreign territory—would leave untouched claims against individuals for abuses 
occurring in the United States or at sea. A less extreme, more likely decision might 
permit claims against some combination of defendants, including, for example, 
individuals, no matter where the claim arises; U.S. citizens, including corporations; 
or foreign citizens living in the United States. The Court might also permit claims 
to proceed when a plaintiff lacks an adequate and available alternative forum in 
which to litigate their claims. 
Second, cases will continue in federal courts under other provisions. If 
plaintiffs assert a claim under whatever remains of the ATS, federal courts are 
likely to assert supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional 
defendants.12 If a plaintiff filed an ATS claim against an individual corporate 
officer, for example, the federal court could assert supplemental jurisdiction over 
the related tort claim against the corporation. Moreover, many claims will trigger 
federal diversity jurisdiction.13 Although the substantive claims might be based on 
state or foreign law, federal courts would have subject matter jurisdiction if the 
parties were diverse. Finally, several federal statutes in addition to the ATS 
authorize federal claims for international human rights violations, including the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),14 the Anti-Terrorism Act,15 and the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.16 Again, a valid claim under any of these 
 
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Many ATS cases involve claims between non-citizen plaintiffs 
and U.S. defendants. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
federal court had diversity jurisdiction over tort claims filed by Indonesian citizens against Exxon 
Mobil, a U.S. citizen). 
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (note) (creating a federal cause of action for torture or 
extrajudicial execution committed under color of foreign law). After the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012), precluding claims against non-
natural persons under the TVPA, litigants quickly amended their pleadings to include claims against 
corporate executives under the TVPA. See, e.g., Order Granting Leave to Amend, In re Chiquita 
Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Litig., 08-01916-MD-MARRA (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2012). 
15. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333–2338 (2006) (creating a civil cause of 
action for certain acts of terrorism). 
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2006) (creating a civil cause of action for victims of trafficking); see, e.g., 
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (upholding a claim that 
Nepali workers were trafficked into Iraq against their will under the ATS, the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, and common law). 
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statutes would trigger supplemental jurisdiction over related claims based on state 
or foreign law. Even the Second Circuit’s decision finding no corporate liability 
under the ATS recognized that ATS claims could be filed against individual 
corporate officials.17 
As a result, human rights litigation will continue in federal courts, regardless 
of the ultimate decision in Kiobel. Restrictions on the ATS, particularly strict limits, 
however, are likely to spur greater interest in state court litigation, as discussed 
below. 
II. PRE-ATS STATE LAW AND STATE COURT HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Long before the Second Circuit decided the Filártiga case, human rights 
advocates looked to state courts to enforce international human rights norms. 
In the 1940s, shortly after ratification of the United Nations Charter and adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),18 several cases sought to 
enforce human rights protections in state courts. 
The early cases relied on the general human rights provisions of the U.N. 
Charter and the UDHR to address human rights violations within the United 
States. For example, in Namba v. McCourt, a decision holding that a statute 
preventing Japanese Americans from owning agricultural land violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment,19 the Oregon Supreme Court looked in part to the 
human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter to support that holding: 
When our nation signed the Charter of the United Nations we thereby 
became bound to the following principles (Article 55c, and see Article 
56): “Universal respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.”20  
In Sei Fujii v. State, California courts relied on the U.N. Charter and the 
UDHR to invalidate the Alien Land Law, which prohibited Japanese nationals 
from owning property in California.21 The California Supreme Court later rejected 
this international law argument and affirmed the decision on constitutional 
 
17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 472 (2011) (mem.) (case argued Feb. 2012 and restored to docket for reargument, 132 S. Ct. 1738 
(No. 10-1491) (Mar. 5, 2012) (mem.)) (“Nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the 
ATS against a corporation’s employees, managers, officers, directors, or any other person who 
commits, or purposefully aids and abets, violations of international law.”). 
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217 
(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
19. Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 583 (Or. 1949). 
20. Id. at 579. 
21. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. App. 1950), vacated, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (striking 
down the Alien Land Law, relying explicitly on the U.N. Charter and the UDHR). 
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grounds.22 In these and similar cases, international law had a significant impact on 
the litigation of equality claims in the postwar years.23 
In later decades, state courts continued to use international norms to 
interpret the reach of rights protected by domestic law.24 In 1981, for example, the 
Oregon Supreme Court relied on several international treaties as guides to 
interpretation of the rights of prisoners under the state constitution.25 A few years 
later, the California Court of Appeal applied the UDHR to help interpret a state 
law obligation to assist the poor.26 
Even after the 1980 Filártiga decision, international human rights cases that 
did not fit within the ATS were litigated as state law claims. A case involving the 
political assassination of an activist from the Philippines, for example, was litigated 
as a tort claim; the federal court asserted pendant jurisdiction over the state tort 
law claims.27 In Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, the family of Benjamin Linder, a U.S. 
citizen executed in Nicaragua, sued the leaders of the Nicaraguan organization 
responsible for his death.28 As U.S. citizens, the Linders could not sue under the 
ATS.29 Instead, they filed a claim in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 
alleging the common law domestic tort of wrongful death. Similarly, a U.S.-citizen 
plaintiff in the consolidated cases against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos obtained 
a judgment based on state law claims.30 And in Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 
an elderly Mexican man sued two Los Angeles police officers and the City of 
Los Angeles for providing Mexican authorities with false information.31 That 
information led to the man’s imprisonment in Mexico for two months for a crime 
in Los Angeles that he did not commit.32 Although his ATS claims were dismissed 
on the merits, he prevailed on his state tort claims, which were ultimately settled 
out of court.33 The Martinez case demonstrates that state common law tort claims 
 
22. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 630. 
23. See generally Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights 
Litigation, 1946, 1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 902 (1984). 
24. See Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating 
International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139, 164–94 (2006) 
(analyzing state law cases invoking international law norms). 
25. See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981) (en banc). 
26. See Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (Cal. App. 1986). 
27. Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Phil., 694 F. Supp. 782, 784 (W.D. Wa. 1988); see 
also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing the district court’s 
dismissal of a wrongful death claim based on assassination of the plaintiff’s husband); Letelier v. 
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C. 1980) (denying a motion to dismiss state and federal 
claims, including assault and battery, arising out of the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni 
Moffitt). 
28. Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 333–34 (11th Cir. 1992). 
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (affording jurisdiction over claims by aliens, not U.S. citizens). 
30. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing claims 
filed by U.S. citizen Jaime Piopongco). 
31. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998). 
32. See id. at 1376–77. 
33. Id. at 1378–82. 
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arising outside the United States can be litigated in U.S. courts in the absence of 
ATS claims. 
In an early human rights claim against a corporation, several Palestinian 
families whose family members died after exposure to tear gas sued a tear gas 
manufacturer for negligent sale of its product to Israel for use by Israeli security 
forces.34 The federal case was dismissed, and plaintiffs refiled in state court, where 
the claims eventually settled. 
In the sixty years since the California Supreme Court rejected a lower court’s 
reliance on the U.N. Charter in Sei Fujii, there has been a sea change in the 
landscape of international human rights law. The United States has been a 
significant participant in these developments. Federal courts have continued to 
cite and rely on international human rights principles, as in Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion invalidating the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons.35 
Major domestic human rights organizations have formally incorporated 
international human rights into their advocacy and litigation.36 Many domestic 
lawsuits are based on facts that would support an ATS claim, and domestic groups 
are increasingly recognizing that adding international law claims may strengthen 
their work.37 If the ATS is restricted, it is likely that international human rights 
arguments and claims will become more common in state court litigation. 
III. ATS CASES WITH STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Since Filártiga, ATS cases have routinely included parallel state law claims. 
Thus, a complaint alleging summary execution generally includes a state claim for 
wrongful death, and a complaint alleging torture generally includes assault and 
battery. The state law claims often drop out when plaintiffs obtain a judgment on 
the international human rights claim. In some cases, however, the state law claims 
have featured prominently in the course of litigation. 
 
34. See Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and Alienage Jurisdiction 
in Light of Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 198 (1996) 
(discussing the federal case and its dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction). 
35. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
36. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union created an active international human 
rights program in its national office in the last decade, and the Center for Constitutional Rights has 
continued to press international law claims in both domestic and international cases. The Bringing 
Rights Home network was formed specifically to “domesticate” international human rights norms. 
The work of these organizations and many others has led to increased domestic international human 
rights litigation and other efforts at the international level. See FORD FOUND., CLOSE TO HOME: 
CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 38–42 (2004). 
37. See generally Paul Hoffman & Adrienne Quarry, The Alien Tort Statute: An Introduction for Civil 
Rights Lawyers, 2 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 129, 139–48, 152 (2009–10) (suggesting to domestic civil rights 
lawyers several areas of domestic litigation where ATS claims might be beneficial, including 
trafficking, sweatshops, and prison litigation). 
UCILR V3I1 Assembled v9 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2013  10:52 AM 
16 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:9 
 
For example, in Doe v. Unocal Corp.,38 a case alleging Unocal’s complicity in 
forced labor, torture, and extrajudicial execution in connection with a natural gas 
pipeline project in Burma, the plaintiffs refiled their pendent state claims in the 
state trial court after the ATS claims were dismissed. While an appeal of the 
dismissal of the ATS claims was pending, plaintiffs completed discovery in state 
court and prepared for trial.39 The case settled several months before the state 
court trial was scheduled to begin and shortly before an en banc oral argument 
before the Ninth Circuit.40 The Unocal plaintiffs were able to assert all of their ATS 
claims as state common law tort claims in the state court case. The same will be 
true in virtually every ATS case. 
Similarly, in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the plaintiffs’ tort claims may proceed 
regardless of what ultimately happens to their ATS claims.41 In July 2011, a 
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit decided that the ATS claims in that case could 
proceed to trial and also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the state law tort 
claims.42 As a result, no matter what the Court decides in Kiobel, the plaintiffs will 
have viable claims on remand in the Exxon case. 
In Bowoto v. Chevron, the district court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on 
both their ATS and state law claims, although the jury ruled against the plaintiffs 
and an appeal was unsuccessful.43 State law claims in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., a case 
 
38. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883–84, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying a motion 
to dismiss); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932, 962–963 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2003). The Ninth Circuit granted Unocal’s petition for rehearing en banc and held one en banc 
argument. While the case was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sosa and the Ninth 
Circuit stayed the Unocal appeal pending the Sosa decision. In December 2004, before a scheduled 
post-Sosa re-argument of the rehearing en banc, the parties announced a settlement and dismissed all 
claims for an undisclosed amount. Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at 
C6. 
39. The trial court held a hearing on choice of law and decided that California law applied to 
the plaintiffs’ claims. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237980, BC 237679, 2002 WL 33944506 at  
*13–14 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002). Although the court, after a trial, refused to allow the plaintiffs 
to pierce the corporate veil of the defendant parent corporations, the court allowed the plaintiffs to 
proceed to trial on the theory that the parent corporations were liable for the actions of their 
subsidiaries, inter alia, on an agency theory. Id. at *10, *13. 
40. See Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6; see supra note 38. 
41. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Exxon filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc concerning the ATS claims in the case, but the Circuit deferred decision until the 
Supreme Court rules in Kiobel. Doe v. Exxon Mobil, Order Deferring Petition for Rehearing En Banc 
Pending Decision in Kiobel, No. 09-7135 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2011). For this reason there have been 
no further proceedings in the case at the district court level. 
42. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 69–70 (holding that Indonesian law applied to the plaintiffs’ 
claims). 
43. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121–31 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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involving medical experimentation on Nigerian children,44 were settled after the 
Second Circuit’s ruling in Kiobel.45 
There may also be statutory bases for human rights claims in state courts. 
For example, California Business and Professions Code section 17200, California’s 
basic unfair competition statute, was found to apply to a claim that Nike 
misrepresented its human rights record.46 However, an attempt by employees of 
Wal-Mart suppliers in China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua to 
hold Wal-Mart accountable for working conditions in the factories of these 
foreign suppliers was unsuccessful, notwithstanding the code of conduct that  
Wal-Mart requires its suppliers to meet.47 The Ninth Circuit rejected an array of 
state law claims, including third-party beneficiary, unjust enrichment, and state law 
tort claims.48 
IV. HURDLES AND ADVANTAGES TO STATE LAW CLAIMS  
AND STATE COURT LITIGATION 
State law claims, whether litigated in state or federal courts, offer litigants 
both advantages and disadvantages as compared to federal claims litigated in 
federal courts. This Part starts by discussing some of the substantive and 
procedural implications of litigating such cases in state courts or bringing state law 
claims in federal courts. The Part then responds to questions about whether such 
cases belong in state courts. 
A. Substantive and Procedural Ramifications of State Law  
and State Court Human Rights Litigation 
The procedural rules governing state court litigation are different in each 
state, which creates obvious difficulties for human rights plaintiffs; by comparison, 
federal court procedure is uniform around the country. These state-to-state 
differences may lead plaintiffs to an analysis of the most favorable procedural 
forum for a human rights case. Because defendants will engage in the same 
analysis, personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens motions will likely be the 
initial battleground in state court human rights cases.49 Each state will have its 
 
44. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2009). 
45. See Sue Reisinger, Pfizer Settles Lawsuits over Drug Trials on Children in Nigeria, CORP. COUNS. 
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202482854504. 
46. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247–49 (Cal. 2002). In 2004, California voters 
imposed standing restrictions on section 17200 plaintiffs that make the statute harder to use in human 
rights cases. See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 315–21 (2009). 
47. See Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009). 
48. Id. at 682–85. 
49. Defendants have filed forum non conveniens (FNC) motions in several ATS cases. 
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99–108 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying an FNC 
motion). In a case for environmental damage filed by indigenous Ecuadorans, Texaco (now Chevron 
Texaco) won an FNC motion after agreeing not to contest jurisdiction if the case was refiled in 
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own standards for personal jurisdiction,50 bounded by constitutional requirements, 
and its own forum non conveniens jurisprudence.51 Similarly, each state will have 
its own pleading requirements, although these are likely to be less demanding than 
the Supreme Court’s requirements in Iqbal.52 Indeed, Iqbal may drive at least some 
human rights claimants to state court no matter what the Supreme Court decides 
in Kiobel. 
State court litigation will usually be based on state tort law, as will state 
claims litigated in federal court pursuant to supplemental or diversity jurisdiction.53 
The elements of state tort claims will vary from state to state, as will the defenses 
and immunities available to defendants. Each state will also have different rules 
regarding duty, causation, proximate cause, and other traditional tort concepts. 
Some of these rules may narrow the opportunity for human rights litigation, but 
state tort claims may also be significantly broader than ATS claims. For example, 
most tort claims are not restricted by the need to show state action. In general, 
state tort law should offer broader coverage than ATS claims, which are limited by 
the historical paradigm test in Sosa.54 
Moreover, some of the controversial issues in ATS litigation in recent years 
will not be controversial in state human rights litigation. There is no state 
(or foreign country that we are aware of) that does not impose tort liability on 
corporations and other non-natural persons. Thus, the corporate liability issue 
initially argued in Kiobel is simply not an issue in state court tort litigation. 
Corporate liability for torts is assumed to be part of the bargain corporations enter 
 
Ecuador. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476–80 (2d Cir. 2002). In 2011, a judge in Ecuador 
issued an $8.6 billion judgment for damages and clean up costs, with the damages increasing to $18 
billion if Chevron does not issue a public apology; the judgment was upheld on appeal. Chevron is now 
engaged in complex legal battles in multiple fora around the world to avoid paying the judgment. For a 
detailed history of the case, see Ecuador Case Overview, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/ 
Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/TexacoChevronlawsuitsreEcuador (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2012). The corporation’s experience may lead future defendants to prefer to litigate in 
U.S. courts, state or federal, rather than face litigation in foreign fora. 
50. Compare California, which allows personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the 
U.S. Constitution, CAL. CIV. PRO. § 410.10 (West 2003), with New York, which provides for a 
narrower conception of personal jurisdiction, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2011) (listing specific 
acts that give rise to personal jurisdiction). 
51. In addition, there is no doctrine of exhaustion of domestic remedies in state court tort 
litigation as there might be in ATS litigation. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 754–55 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (applying the doctrine of prudential exhaustion of domestic remedies in an ATS 
case). 
52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80 (2009) (specifying that the “plausibility” standard 
for assessing whether a complaint states a claim, established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007), applies to all federal court civil litigation). 
53. State law might also permit courts to recognize common law torts based on international 
human rights law or to use international law obligations to interpret state common law, statutes, or 
constitutional norms. If the Supreme Court significantly narrows the ATS, plaintiffs are likely to test 
these common law theories in state courts. 
54. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
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into for corporate existence.55 Similarly, there is little doubt that state tort law 
recognizes aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy liability.56 Overall, theories of 
liability in state court tort cases are likely to be more expansive and less contested 
than they have been in ATS litigation. 
State claims will trigger conflict of laws issues in cases where the conduct 
occurs on foreign soil. Conflict of laws rules, which vary from state to state, turn 
in part on whether the defendants and plaintiffs are citizens or residents of the 
forum state and whether relevant decisions or other acts took place in the state. 
The greater the connection to the forum state, the more likely it is that the state 
will apply its own laws. Although transitory tort cases involving foreign litigants 
and foreign events will generally apply the law of the place of injury,57 a state court 
may apply the law of the forum with respect to particular issues where there is no 
actual conflict between that law and local law.58 Further, state courts applying state 
conflict of law principles could decide to apply forum law based on a balance-of-
interests analysis.59 
At a more practical level, the statutes of limitations applicable to most state 
tort claims will be much shorter than the ten-year statute applicable to ATS 
claims.60 This may present insurmountable difficulties. Human rights cases are 
complicated, with plaintiffs who are often traumatized and unaware of their legal 
options. If plaintiffs take too long to obtain counsel willing to shoulder the burden 
of litigating claims arising abroad, it may be too late to file a claim. However, 
generous tolling doctrines available in state courts may ameliorate the time 
pressure, although these too will vary by state. 
 
55. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Posner, J.) (“[I]n the United States the liability of a corporation for torts committed by its employees 
in the course of their employment is strict, on the theory that strict liability for employees’ torts gives 
corporations (and other employers) incentives to police their employees that are needed because the 
employees themselves will usually be judgment proof and hence not responsive to tort sanctions.”). 
56. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477–78 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS (SECOND) § 876(a)–(b) (1979), for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, respectively). 
57. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 127 (1904); Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that Indonesian law applied to claims arising in 
Indonesia). Application of local law to a case having no connection at all to the forum state could 
raise constitutional issues. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (suggesting 
due process limits on a state’s ability to apply its own law to a claim with no contacts to the state and 
as to which the state has no interest). 
58. In Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., a California district court applying California choice-of-law rules 
held that California law applied to a claim arising in Nigeria because there was no conflict and because 
California and Nigeria both had interests in the claim. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 
2006 WL 2455761, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006). 
59. There are complicated choice-of-law issues in ATS cases too, but courts generally apply 
either international standards or federal common law principles to resolve most issues. See generally 
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–41. 
60. The ATS contains no statute of limitations, but all courts to consider the issue have 
applied the ten-year statute included in the TVPA. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 386. 
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At an even more practical level, state judges and state juries deciding human 
rights cases may (or may not) differ from federal court judges and juries. In some 
parts of the country, plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer state court juries, who are generally 
drawn from a smaller geographic area. But it is impossible to generalize about the 
impact of a state court jury on a particular case. There may also be differences 
between federal and state court judges. Because they have life tenure, federal 
judges may be more willing to challenge important local corporations facing such 
serious allegations. State court judges without such tenure who must run for re-
election may be more vulnerable to pressure, even if it is self-imposed. Although 
these differences are not unique to human rights litigation, they may be of 
significance in high profile human rights cases. 
Finally, some defendants in ATS litigation have argued that state law claims 
are barred by the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption. The only ATS case where 
this argument has been accepted with respect to state court tort claims is Mujica v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp.61 The doctrine ordinarily applies only where state statutes 
conflict with specific federal policies or foreign affairs decisions or actions.62 Such 
preemption does not usually apply in areas of traditional state authority, such as 
state tort law. However, if ATS cases shift to state court, defendants are likely to 
push expansive notions of preemption to avoid such cases. 
B. Are International Law Claims a Bad Fit in State Courts? 
Some commentators question both whether state law is an appropriate tool 
by which to evaluate international human rights violations and whether state court 
judges and juries will be open to litigation of international human rights claims in 
local courts. We agree that international human rights violations should be 
identified and remedied as such. One of the great benefits of ATS litigation is that 
these violations have been addressed within an international human rights 
framework. This is a great advance in international efforts to hold human rights 
violators accountable. However, state courts can also function as effective fora for 
human rights accountability. 
 
61. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1187–88 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
An appeal in the case has been pending since 2005 and has now been stayed pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kiobel. This argument was specifically rejected in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, No. Civ. 
A. 01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL 516744, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006), appeal dismissed, 473 F.3d 345 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). See also Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that 
children of U.S. citizens allegedly tortured in Iraq stated claims under Florida and Oklahoma law), 
vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17034 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
62. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (finding a California statute 
extending statute of limitations for Holocaust insurance claims preempted due to conflict with 
“exercise of the federal executive authority”); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 
366 (2000) (finding a Massachusetts state law placing sanctions on Burma preempted); Zschernig 
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (finding an Oregon state law preempted because it intruded into 
foreign affairs). 
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1. The “Garden Variety” Tort Problem 
The word “torture” captures the horror of the calculated infliction of severe 
pain by state actors for a specific purpose, usually to gain political advantage. The 
very government officials who should protect against evil turn instead against their 
people and inflict immeasurable harms. In a thoughtful decision in Xuncax v. 
Gramajo,63 District Court Judge Douglas Woodlock concluded that it was far 
preferable to label such conduct a violation of international law, rather than 
“reduc[e] it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.”64 He found 
state tort law to be “an inadequate placeholder” for the values protected by 
international human rights law.65 
Judge Woodlock, however, was writing in 1995, at a time when the ATS was 
available to the plaintiffs before him. Faced with the option of applying local tort 
law or no law at all, he surely would have applied domestic law to the horrors 
suffered by the plaintiffs in the Xuncax case. Tort law, of course, addresses not just 
minor (“garden-variety”) car accidents and slip-and-falls, but also heartbreaking 
wrongs, including intentional torts, with catastrophic impacts on their victims. 
State courts can apply municipal tort law without diminishing the gravity of the 
abuses alleged and without converting the cases into insignificant tort cases. 
Moreover, state common law may encompass violations of the law of nations, 
so that it might be possible in some states to sue for torture under state law. 
It is also likely that international human rights issues will become a part of 
such state court cases, even if the cause of action sounds in tort. For example, 
a torture victim bringing a state court tort claim might introduce expert testimony 
about the impact of torture on the victim. The same may be true of claims such as 
disappearance or extrajudicial killing. Moreover, the human rights context of a 
state tort claim will almost certainly be presented in some fashion to the jury. 
In particular, evidence that defendants (corporations, for example) had notice of 
human rights violations but continued to be complicit in them would be relevant 
both to any mental element of a tort and also to impose punitive damages. 
Similarly, the demanding requirements for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress would be met by proof of universal human rights norms of the 
kind recognized under Sosa. And, the existence of human rights reports about the 
facts at issue in a case might be relevant in opposition to a motion to dismiss, to 
satisfy the Iqbal pleading standards66 in federal court, or to defend against a 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
63. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995). 
64. Id. at 183. 
65. Id. 
66. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (requiring a “plausibility” standard for assessing 
whether a complaint states a claim). 
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2. The Comfort Factor: Why Should This Case Be in a State Court? 
Federal court litigators often assume that state court judges will be more 
skeptical of international cases than federal judges. Early ATS cases, however, 
were hardly smooth going in federal courts, where it took many years and many 
decisions before federal judges became familiar with the premise underlying the 
statute. As more state law claims are filed and decided, a similar process may occur 
in state courts as well.67 Perhaps more importantly, most ATS cases involve local 
defendants, and many involve local plaintiffs. State court judges and juries should 
be perfectly comfortable deciding cases in which a local resident is accused of 
having tortured and killed civilians, even if the events took place in a different 
country. Similarly, local judges and juries may be very interested in holding 
accountable local corporations accused of wrongdoing, even if those wrongs 
occurred outside the United States. 
In a few instances, when judges, jurors, or members of the public ask why a 
case is in a local state court, the answer may be that the claims involve universal 
wrongs. But far more often the answer will strike closer to home: the case is in a 
local court because the defendant lives in the neighborhood; because the 
corporation is a citizen of the state, with local headquarters; or because local 
residents are among the victims of the human rights abuses. 
CONCLUSION 
An assessment of the likelihood of state court litigation for human rights 
violations must start with an understanding of the tenacious commitment of the 
many, many people who have been injured by such abuses. People whose lives 
have been so badly scarred by genocide, torture, summary executions, and 
disappearances will pursue every available option to obtain some measure of 
justice. Benjamin Linder’s father, David Linder, never gave up the fight to hold 
someone liable for his son’s murder. Dolly Filártiga, sister of Joelito Filártiga, still 
breaks into tears when she talks about the night that she saw her brother’s badly 
tortured body. But she also remembers clearly that she vowed that night to hold 
her brother’s murderer accountable for what he had done.68 
Motivated plaintiffs will continue to search for any means to hold 
accountable those responsible for the abuses they and their family members have 
suffered, and human rights lawyers will look for ways to represent them in that 
struggle. Survivors have filed civil and criminal complaints in countries around the  
 
 
67. Given that there are many more state court judges than federal judges, the process in state 
courts is likely to develop more slowly. However, when Filártiga was decided in 1980, very few lawyers 
or judges had any understanding of international law. Today, most law students are exposed to 
international law in law school, so judges (and their clerks) at all levels have a much greater 
background on which to draw when faced with a case involving international human rights. 
68. See Dolly Filártiga, Foreword to BETH STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at xvii. 
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world, administrative claims with domestic governments, and complaints and 
petitions with countless international regulatory bodies. Here in the United States, 
if the Supreme Court further restricts access to federal courts, victims of human 
rights abuses will increasingly file their claims in state courts. 
From the perspective of plaintiffs, the future of state law human rights 
litigation is simple: if such litigation is a viable option, even if a difficult one, and it 
is better than the alternatives, plaintiffs will make every effort to use it in their 
search for justice. 
  
